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I. INTRODUCTION
With the advent of complex multi-claim litigation, cumulative
exposure cases, long-term environmental damage claims and toxic
tort litigation, courts have faced the question of how to allocate in-
demnity payments among multiple insurers and their insureds on
an increasingly frequent basis.' The stakes of "environmental litiga-
tion" are staggering.2 For example, cleanup costs under the Com-
prehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability
Act (CERCLA) are projected to reach between eighty billion and
one trillion dollars. 3 Although complex environmental coverage
1. See C. MacNeil Mitchell, Pollution Insurance Coverage: Practical Suggestions for
Resolving Allocation Issues, 12 No. 8 CORP. COUNS. 4, Jan. 1998, at *4 (explaining
that these cases arise as result of so-called long-tail insured losses). One commen-
tator describes these cases as "those in which the 'accident' . . . or 'occurrence' . ..
causing the loss took place over more than one - and usually five or more -
years." Id. Such losses are also commonly known as "progressive injuries."
Michael G. Doherty, Comment, Allocating Progressive Injury Liability Among Successive
Insurance Policies, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 257, 257 & n.1 (1997). Courts typically con-
sider complex allocation and exhaustion issues in the context of long-tail injury
cases involving environmental contamination and toxic torts. See, e.g., Koppers Co.
v. Aetna Cas. and Sur. Co., 98 F.3d 1440, 1444 (3d Cir. 1996) (involving liability for
property damage to soil, sub-soil and groundwater); Uniroyal, Inc. v. Home Ins.
Co., 707 F. Supp. 1368, 1369 (E.D.N.Y. 1988) (considering indemnification for
illnesses "Agent Orange" herbicide allegedly caused); Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. United
Ins. Co., 650 A.2d 974, 976 (N.J. 1994) (addressing coverage for asbestos-related
personal injury and property damage claims).
2. See Debra Winthrop Pollack, Environmental Damages Analysis: The Key to Liti-
gation Strategy, in RISK ASSESSMENT FOR INSURANCE COUNSEL, at 85, 87 (PLI Litig. &
Admin. Practice Course Handbook Series No. 550, 1996) (explaining that "envi-
ronmental litigation" encompasses actions originating from both environmental
law enforcement as well as private toxic tort actions). For a discussion of courts'
potential to reach different allocation conclusions in toxic tort cases and in "tradi-
tional" environmental damages cases, see Garrett G. Gillespie, Note, The Allocation
of Coverage Responsibility Among Multiple Triggered Commercial General Liability Policies
in Environmental Cases: Life After Owens-Illinois, 15 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 525, 559-60
(1996).
3. See David L. Markell, The Federal Superfund Program: Proposals for Strengthening
the Federal/State Relationship, 18 WM. & MARYJ. ENVTL. L. 1, 15 (1993) (discussing
costs of Superfund cleanups). In 1993, the average cost of remedying the hazard-
ous condition at a Superfund National Priority List site exceeded $30 million. See
Kenneth S. Abraham, Cleaning Up the Environmental Liability Insurance Mess, 27 VAL.
U. L. REv. 601, 603 (1993). Although insurance companies may have anticipated
claims for pollution-related damages, it appears unlikely that they prepared for the
tremendous liability arising from Superfund and similar state statutes. See North-
ern States Power Co. v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 523 N.W.2d 657, 660-61 (Minn. 1994).
Because CERCLA defines "response" costs as "remedial action," unbounded even
by property value, environmental damages are "theoretically limitless" under the
federal statute. Id. at 661 (citing Comprehensive Environmental Response, Com-
pensation and Liability Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (1980) (codi-
fied as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-75 (1994)). Consequently, it is extremely
difficult to calculate potential liability for environmental damage. See id. This diffi-
culty does not, however, make the potential for liability any less realistic. See Chris
[Vol. X: p. 25
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litigation has received a great deal of attention over the last decade,
the judiciary has only recently begun to address the problematic
allocation and exhaustion issues created largely by multiple-trigger
rulings in favor of policyholders. 4 While it is impossible to recon-
cile substantively the myriad of allocation and exhaustion decisions,
one recurring theme is many courts' desire to maximize the cover-
age available to policyholders. 5 In light of this, as well as the great
financial stakes of environmental litigation, it is imperative that
Roush, Insurance: Fields of Green - and Disaster Areas, Bus. WK., Jan. 9, 1995, at 94
(quoting Dean R. O'Hare).
4. See C. MacNeil Mitchell, Allocating Liability for "Long Tail" Pollution Damages,
12 No. 7 CoRP. COUNS. 11, Dec. 1997, at *11 (noting that "[u]nlike the more set-
tled rules of law governing 'scope of coverage' issues, the rules governing 'alloca-
tion of coverage' have not yet achieved the same degree of appellate
clarification"). To the contrary, some higher courts have moved away from earlier
bright line rules to permit more flexible allocation at the trial court level. See id.;
see also David 0. Larson et al., Review of Recent Developments in Excess, Surplus Lines,
and Reinsurance Law, 32 TORT & INS. L.J. 359, 360 (1997) (highlighting that Califor-
nia's appellate courts have granted trial courts discretion to choose most equitable
allocation method).
A court's choice regarding the applicable trigger of coverage bears directly on
the issue of allocation. See Northern States Power, 523 N.W.2d at 662 (explaining that
"choice of trigger theory is related to the method a court will choose to allocate
damages between insurers"). Although the allocation and "trigger of coverage"
issues are related, it is important to note their conceptual and analytical differ-
ences. While "trigger analysis" determines which policies are potentially liable, "al-
location analysis" determines the amount of liability any one policy will bear.
Additionally, although allocation is not usually an issue where damages are con-
fined to a single policy period, when it is an issue, trigger analysis is considerably
important. One commentator states that "pinning down the trigger period to
where it is no longer in real dispute is probably the single most important ingredi-
ent in resolving the overall insurance allocation question." Mitchell, supra note 1,
at *5.
5. See, e.g., Lac d'Amiante du Quebec, Ltee. v. American Home Assurance
Co., 613 F. Supp. 1549, 1551 (D.N.J. 1985) (observing that "the courts have offered
conflicting interpretations of the manner in which virtually identical policies allo-
cate liability"). In Lac d'Amiante, a case in which property damage led to an asbes-
tos coverage dispute, the court attributed the inconsistentjudicial outcomes in this
type of case to the difficulties inherent in both defining the concept of "injury" as
well as determining specific coverage periods in which injury might have occurred.
See id. The Lac d' Amiante court also highlighted some courts' "desire... to maxi-
mize coverage even when to do so requires judicial sleight of hand." Id. Similarly,
in one of the most well-known decisions in this area, Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. United
Insurance Co., the New Jersey Supreme Court acknowledged that "the differing
interpretations of which occurrence constitutes the injury contemplated by the
language of insurance policies" sometimes result from a "'leap of logic' that all the
damages can be thought to be imposed in any one of the years of exposure or
release." Owens-Illinois, Inc., v. United Ins. Co., 650 A.2d 974, 989 (N.J. 1994)
(quoting Lac D'Amiante, 613 F. Supp. at 1551). Many commentators assert that
courts should reject this "coverage maximization" rationale because the long-term
results it produces are "both inefficient and unfair." Doherty, supra note 1, at 266-
67.
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both carriers and insureds understand the issues involved in multi-
ple-policy coverage litigation.
This Comment provides a broad survey of insurance allocation
issues. Part II reviews the insurance concepts that underlie the mul-
tiple-policy coverage issues.6 Part III provides an overview of the
judicial application of "horizontal" versus "vertical" policy exhaus-
tion.7 Part IV outlines the four principal methods by which courts
allocate indemnification obligations among multiple carriers.8 Part
V addresses allocation of defense costs.9 Part VI summarizes alloca-
tion of shares to the policyholder, also known as "orphan shares."10
II. BACKGROUND OF THE GENERAL STRUCTURE OF
INSURANCE POLICIES
A. Underlying Policy Language
From the late 1960s through the mid-1980s, comprehensive
general liability (CGL) policies contained insuring agreements
under which the insurer would pay "all sums which the insured
shall become legally obligated to pay as damages because of prop-
erty damage or bodily injury to which this insurance applies, caused
by an occurrence."" The CGL's policy's definitions of "bodily in-
6. For a review of the insurance concepts that underlie the multiple-policy
coverage issues that subsequent Parts of this Comment discuss, see infra notes 11-
20 and accompanying text.
7. For an overview of the judicial application of "horizontal" versus "vertical"
policy exhaustion, see infra notes 21-51 and accompanying text.
8. For an outline of the four principal methods by which courts allocate in-
demnification obligations among multiple carriers, see infra notes 52-105 and ac-
companying text.
9. For a discussion of allocation of defense costs, see infra notes 106-14 and
accompanying text.
10. For a summary of allocation of shares to the policyholder, also known as
"orphan shares," see infra notes 115-35 and accompanying text.
11. Jeffrey Silberfield, Duty to Defend Under CGL Policies, in HAzARous WASTE,
Toxic TORT, AND PRODUCTS LIABILITY INSURANCE PROBLEMS 1987, at 9, 11 (PLI
Com. L. & Practice Course Handbook Series No. 419, 1987). The insuring agree-
ments in standard CGL policies of the late 1960s through the mid-1980s stated the
following, or similarly:
The Company will pay on behalf of the insured all sums which the in-
sured shall become legally obligated to pay as damages because of
Coverage A. bodily injury or
Coverage B. property damage
to which this insurance applies, caused by an occurrence, and the com-
pany shall have the right and duty to defend any suit against the insured
seeking damages on account of such property damage or bodily injury,
even if any of the allegations of the suit are groundless, false or fraudu-
lent, and may make such investigation and settlement of any claim or suit
as it deems expedient, but the Company shall not be obligated to pay any
claim or judgment or to defend any suit after the applicable limit of the
[Vol. X: p. 25
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jury" and "property damage" made it clear that the insured would
be indemnified only for losses occurring during the policy period. 12
A preliminary question in any coverage analysis is, therefore,
whether damage or injury during the policy period triggered a pol-
icy's coverage. This is known as the "trigger of coverage" issue.
Many CGL policies also contain an "other insurance" clause,
which limits the carrier's obligations when the insured has "other
valid and collectible insurance" available. 13 When other insurance
is available, if the CGL policy is primary, the carrier's obligations
are unaffected unless the other collectible insurance is also pri-
mary, in which case the insurers will share the loss. 14 The "other
insurance" clause further provides that if the CGL policy is excess
insurance, the insurer will pay its share of the loss that exceeds the
sum of "(1) [t] he total amount that all [collectible] other insurance
would pay for the loss in the absence of [that] insurance; and (2)
[t] he total of all deductible and self-insured amounts under all that
other insurance. '15 Additionally, the excess insurer's duty to de-
Company's liability has been exhausted by payment of judgment or
settlements.
Id.
12. See id. CGL policies commonly defined "occurrence," "bodily injury" and
"property damage" as follows:
"Occurrence" means an accident, including continuous or repeated ex-
posure to conditions, which results in bodily injury or property damage
neither expected nor intended from the standpoint of the insured.
"Bodily injury" means bodily injury, sickness or disease sustained by
any person which occurs during the policy period, including death at any time
resulting therefrom.
"Property damage" means (1) physical injury to or destruction of tan-
gible property which occurs during the policy period, including the loss of use
thereof at any time resulting therefrom, or (2) loss of use of tangible
property which has not been physically injured or destroyed, provided
such loss of use is caused by an occurrence during the policy period.
Id. (emphasis added).
13. Id. The New Jersey Supreme Court noted in Owens-Illinois v. United In-
surance Co. that "[h]istorically, 'other insurance' clauses were designed to prevent
multiple recoveries when more than one policy provided coverage for a given loss."
Owens-Illinois v. United Ins. Co., 650 A.2d 974, 995 (NJ. 1994).
14. See H. James Wulfsberg & Timothy A. Colvig, The 1986 Commercial General
Liability Insurance Program, in CONSTRUCTION Cowr.Acrrs AND LrrGATION 1988, at
446 (PLI Real Est. L. & Practice Course Handbook Series No. 308, 1988) (stating
that "[i]f this insurance is primary, our obligations are not affected unless any of
the other insurance is also primary and... [t]hen, we will share with all that other
insurance by the method described ... below"). For an explanation of the method
by which insurers share the loss, see infra note 17 and accompanying text.
15. Wulfsberg & Colvig, supra note 14, at 446. A typical "other insurance"
states: "Excess Insurance. This insurance is excess over any of the other insurance,
whether primary, excess, contingent or on any other basis." Id. The clause contin-
1999]
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fend under the "other insurance" clause is limited.16 When multi-
ple insurers are to share a loss, the clause calls for "contribution by
equal shares" if permissible and "contribution by limits" in all other
cases.
17
B. Excess Liability Insurance Policies
1. Primary Policies Versus Excess Policies
Policyholders exposed to large amounts of liability frequently
purchase several layers of insurance coverage. Primary insurance
typically comprises the first layer of coverage. Most primary-level
policies impose on the insurer a duty to defend, subject to appro-
priate notice and tender. A carrier's obligations under a primary
policy attach immediately upon the happening of a covered event
or "occurrence."
The other layers of coverage are excess layers. Liability under
an excess policy attaches only upon the exhaustion of the limits of
some other policy or policies.18 The excess insurer is liable, up to
its policy limits, for the amount of covered loss exceeding the limits
of the underlying policy or policies, including self-insured reten-
tions or deductibles. Also, in contrast to primary policies, excess
ues by explaining how the loss will be shared, as outlined in the text accompanying
this note. See id. The clause concludes: " [w]e will share the remaining loss, if any,
with any other insurance that is not described in this Excess Insurance provision
and was not bought specifically to apply in excess of the Limits of Insurance shown
in the Declarations of this Coverage Part." Id. at 447.
16. See id. at 446. Specifically, the CGL policy provides that when the insur-
ance is excess, the insurer will not be obligated to defend any claim that any other
insurer must defend. See id. Further, although the excess insurer will defend in
cases where no other insurer will defend, in doing so the excess insurer is entitled
to the insured's rights against all non-defending insurers. See id.
17. Id. at 447. The pertinent language of the other insurance clause states:
Method of Sharing.
If all of the other insurance permits contribution by equal shares, we
will follow this method also. Under this approach each insurer contrib-
utes equal amounts until it has paid its applicable limit of insurance or
none of the loss remains, whichever comes first.
If any of the other insurance does not permit contribution by equal
shares, we will contribute by limits. Under this method, each insurer's
share is based on the ratio of its applicable limit of insurance to the total
applicable limits of insurance of all insurers.
Id.
18. See General Refractories Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co., No. CIV.A. 89-7924, 1994
WL 246375, at *4 (E.D. Pa. June 8, 1994) (explaining that distinction between
primary and excess policies "is critical, because unlike primary insurers, excess in-
surers are not liable merely because of the occurrence of an injury within the
scope of the policy"). Exhaustion of the primary insurance is a condition prece-
dent to the triggering of an excess insurer's liability. See id.
[Vol. X: p. 25
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liability policies typically do not impose on the insurer a duty to
defend.19
2. Follow-Form Versus Umbrella Excess Policies
Excess insurance, as explained above, is coverage that attaches
only after the exhaustion of a predetermined amount of underlying
coverage. A follow-form excess policy provides coverage above the
underlying limits according to the same terms and conditions as the
primary policy. If the policyholder has only primary and excess pol-
icies, the excess layer of coverage sits directly above the primary
layer or self-insured retention. Follow-form excess policies also
commonly contain unique provisions that the underlying primary
policy does not contain, such as an additional exclusion. If the poli-
cyholder has umbrella liability coverage as well as primary coverage,
the excess layer sits above the umbrella layer. An umbrella excess
policy may provide broader coverage than scheduled underlying in-
surance policies. This coverage may occur due to either an exclu-
sion in the primary policy or the primary insurer's insolvency. 20 An
umbrella policy that "drops down" usually does so subject to the
policyholder paying some prescribed retention amount.
III. "HoRizoNrAL" VERSUS "VERTICAL" EXHAUSTION or POLICIES
A. Background
When a claim potentially triggers numerous layers of coverage
over multiple policy periods, perhaps the most critical concern
from an excess insurer's standpoint is the order in which a court
will decide to exhaust the policies at issue. 21 The two basic methods
of exhaustion courts apply are "horizontal" exhaustion, or "exhaus-
tion by layers,"' 2 2 and "vertical exhaustion," or "exhaustion by
19. For additional discussion of the excess insurer's duty to defend, see supra
note 16 and accompanying text.
20. See, e.g., Federal Ins. Co. v. Scarsella Bros., Inc., 931 F.2d 599, 605 (9th Cir.
1991) (explaining that inclusion of insolvency in policy term "exhausted" obli-
gated excess insurer to drop down and cover policyholder in place of insolvent
primary insurer).
21. See H. Wesley Sunu et al., Recent Developments in Excess, Surplus Lines, and
Reinsurance, 31 TORT & INS. L.J. 239, 245 (1996) (stating that "[t]lhe excess carrier's
ultimate exposure for contributing ... is completely dependent upon the determi-
nation reached by the courts concerning whether a horizontal or vertical alloca-
tion formula will be applied at the primary layer").
22. For a comprehensive discussion of horizontal exhaustion, see infra notes
26-45 and accompanying text.
1999]
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years." 2 3 Whether a court applies horizontal or vertical exhaustion
determines which policies need to be exhausted before the trigger-
ing of a particular excess policy.
Briefly stated, those advocating vertical exhaustion argue that
"underlying policies" refer only to those policies directly under the
excess policy at issue; that is, only the primary or other underlying
policies issued during the same policy period as the excess policy at
issue must be exhausted before triggering the excess policy.24 Con-
versely, those advocating horizontal exhaustion assert that all trig-
gered underlying policies must be exhausted, regardless of the
policy period, before the excess insurer becomes liable. Excess lia-
bility policies are often silent regarding whether only the immedi-
ate underlying policy or all lower level policies must be exhausted
before the excess coverage is triggered. This Part examines exhaus-
tion approaches before discussing allocation theories, as an exhaus-
tion ruling favorable to the excess insurer might fully release that
carrier from participation in the allocation process. 2 5
23. For a comprehensive discussion of vertical exhaustion, see infra notes 46-
51 and accompanying text.
Although most courts have adopted either horizontal or vertical exhaustion,
one court recently eschewed both approaches. See Carter-Wallace, Inc. v. Admiral
Ins. Co., 712 A.2d 1116, 1123 (NJ. 1998). In Carter-Wallace, the New Jersey
Supreme Court adopted a hybrid approach, whereby damages were apportioned
among the years in which policies were triggered "without reference to the layer-
ing of policies in the triggered years." Id. at 1123-24 (citation omitted). Under the
hybrid approach, however, each coverage layer must be depleted within any single
year before the next level can be tapped. See .id. at 1124.
24. The policyholder is frequently the party arguing in favor of vertical ex-
haustion because it leaves other primary policies available, or unexhausted. Verti-
cal exhaustion provides the insured with substantially greater coverage than does
horizontal exhaustion, as primary policies usually provide defense costs in addition
to the limits of liability, while excess policies generally do not provide for defense
costs.
25. The application of a particular exhaustion approach, usually horizontal,
can absolve the excess carrier, either in whole or in part, of liability to the policy-
holder. Such results have led counsel for policyholders to lament, "[i]n order to
even get in the door with excess insurers - to 'tap' those excess policies for cover-
age - the insured must overcome the many 'exhaustion' hurdles upon which ex-
cess insurers rely to deny coverage. The insured does not face these issues with its
primary insurers." David W. Steuber & Michael A. Rossi, What Difference Can a
"Layer'Make?, COVERAGE, Nov.-Dec. 1994, at 1, 4. For an example of a court's appli-
cation of horizontal exhaustion and its subsequent finding that an insured could
not recover from its excess insurer without first exhausting all triggered primary
policies, see Continental Cas. Co. v. Armstrong World Indus., 776 F. Supp. 1296,
1301 (N.D. Ill. 1991); see also infra notes 26-30 and accompanying text for a com-
plete discussion of Continental Casualty.
[Vol. X: p. 25
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B. "Horizontal Exhaustion" or "Exhaustion by Layers"
Horizontal exhaustion requires each layer of coverage to in-
demnify the policyholder to the full extent of its respective policy
limits before requiring contribution by any policies in the layer
above. When an occurrence potentially implicates more than pol-
icy layer, each triggered primary policy can be called upon to re-
spond to the claim up to the full limits of that policy. Excess
carriers often argue for application of this "exhaustion by layers"
approach, which triggers their policies only after the limits of all
triggered primary policies have been exhausted.
The court in Continental Casualty Co. v. Armstrong World Indus-
tries, Inc.2 6 adopted horizontal exhaustion. In Continental Casualty,
an action involving thousands of asbestos-related personal injury
claims spanning twenty-two years of coverage, the district court held
that the policyholder was required to exhaust all of its twenty-four
triggered primary liability policies before it called upon Continen-
tal Casualty Company's (CNA's) two excess umbrella policies for
payment. 27 The court found that the CNA policies' "other insur-
ance" clauses stated with reasonable clarity that coverage would
only begin after the exhaustion of any applicable primary insur-
ance. 28 Consequently, the CNA policies' plain meaning contra-
dicted the policyholder's claim that only the underlying primary
policies issued during the same policy period need be exhausted
before CNA's excess liability would begin. 29 By ruling in favor of
the insurer, the court directed that policies were to be exhausted by
layers.30
26. 776 F. Supp. 1296 (N.D. Ill. 1991).
27. Id. at 1298-99, 1301.
28. See id. at 1301. Although schedules of underlying primary policies were
attached to both CNA policies, the CNA policies' "other insurance" clauses did not
confine their limitations to the listed policies. See id. In addition, each CNA policy
defined "ultimate net loss" as excluding amounts other insurance covered. See id.
Specifically, one excess policy excluded payments that were recoverable "through
any other valid and collectible insurance." Id. The other policy allowed deduc-
tions for "other insurances . . . other than the [listed] underlying insurance and
excess insurance purchased specifically to be in excess of this policy .... " Id.
(alteration in original).
29. See id. The Continental Casualty court reasoned that "[t]he CNA policies
are both specifically designated as 'umbrella' excess policies, designed to afford
coverage only when all other types of insurance are exhausted." Id. (citing 8A
APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAw AND PRAcICa § 4096, at 348 & § 4909.85, at 453-54
(1981)). In addition, because the CNA policies were unambiguous regarding the
exhaustion requirement, the doctrine of contra proferentum (construe against
drafter) was inapplicable. See id. at 1301.
30. See id.
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When a similar dispute arose in General Refractories Co. v. Allstate
Insurance Co.,31 the United States District Court for the Eastern Dis-
trict of Pennsylvania relied on Continental Casualty in applying hori-
zontal exhaustion. 32 In General Refractories, the policyholder sought
a determination of its rights under certain excess policies issued to
it by Commercial Union. 33 At issue was whether the policyholder
"must exhaust all primary coverage before seeking indemnification
from any of its excess insurers, or whether it need only exhaust the
limits of the [directly] underlying policies. ' 34 Citing Continental
Casualty, the General Refractories court rejected the policyholder's
contention that Commercial Union became liable immediately
upon the exhaustion of the policies directly underlying its excess
umbrella policies. 35 Instead, the court emphasized that the excess
policies at issue specifically provided that Commercial Union "shall
not be liable for any 'ultimate net loss' so long as 'other valid and
collectible insurance' exists."36
The General Refractories court advanced as an important addi-
tional factor in support of its application of horizontal exhaustion
the underlying purpose of the excess insurance policies.37 The
court stated that "[u]nlike primary insurance policies, umbrella
policies' raison d'etre is to provide affordable protection against ex-
cess judgments of third parties . . . [which] is underscored by the
difference in premiums... insurance companies charge for the two
types of policies." 38 Specifically, the General Reftactories court high-
lighted that premiums for umbrella insurance are significantly less
than premiums for primary insurance because the related risks for
umbrella policies are substantially less than those for primary poli-
cies.39 Further, the court recognized that because to permit the
policyholder to seek payment from its excess carrier before exhaust-
31. No. CIV.A.89-7924, 1994 WL 246375 (E.D. Pa. June 8, 1994).
32. See id. at *8.
33. See id. at *1. In General Reftactories, thousands of individuals sued the in-
sured, a manufacturer of products containing asbestos and silica, claiming that
they were injured by the use of the products. See id.
34. Id. at *7 (emphasis added). In General Reftactories, as in Continental Casu-
alty, each of Commercial Union's excess policies contained a declaration sheet
naming specific underlying policies. See id.
35. See id. at *8.
36. General Reftactories, 1994 WL 246375, at *8. As the General Refractories court
highlighted, Commercial Union's excess policy provisions "unambiguously provide
that even if the stated policy limits are exhausted, [Commercial Union's] liability
will not arise if other insurance is available." Id.
37. See id.
38. See id. (citation omitted).
39. See id.
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ing all of its primary insurance would be to subvert the purpose of
excess insurance, horizontal exhaustion was appropriate. 40
State courts in several recent decisions have adopted horizon-
tal exhaustion. 41 In United States Gypsum Co. v. Admiral Insurance
Co.,42 a property damage case, the Illinois Court of Appeals af-
firmed the trial court's ruling requiring the policyholder to exhaust
all triggered primary coverage before it could recover under the
excess policies at issue. 43 Significantly, the United States Gypsum
court noted that adopting vertical exhaustion, as the policyholder
advocated, "would allow [the policyholder] to effectively manipu-
late the source of its recovery, avoiding difficulties encountered as
the result of its [decisions regarding insurance] ."44 Consequently,
40. See id.
41. See, e.g., Community Redev. Agency v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 57 Cal. Rptr.
2d 755, 762 (Ct. App. 1996) (applying horizontal exhaustion and finding that um-
brella carrier need not drop down to defend policyholder when unexhausted pri-
mary policies covered different periods of time during continuing property
damage period); Southern Pacific Rail Corp. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's,
London, No. BC154722 (Cal. Super. Ct. Jan. 23, 1998) (explaining that horizontal
exhaustion applies to actual policies and self-insured retentions [SIRs] and that
SIR amount applies to each new claim); Nucor Corp. v. Hartford Accident & In-
demnity Co., No. CV-97-08308 (Ariz. Super. Ct. Sept. 29, 1997) (finding that hori-
zontal exhaustion is effective method of preserving judicial resources);
Conductron Corp. v. American Employer's Ins. Co., Nos. 93-E-149, 93-C-599 (N.H.
Super. Ct. Mar. 4, 1997) (rejecting vertical stacking and holding that excess cover-
age is available only after underlying policies are exhausted); Schering Corp. v.
Evanston Ins. Co., No. UNN L 97311-88 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. Jan. 24, 1995)
(finding that all primary coverage must be exhausted before policyholder can pro-
ceed against excess insurers).
42. 643 N.E.2d 1226 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994).
43. Id. at 1262. In United States Gypsum, a manufacturer of asbestos-containing
building materials moved for a declaratory judgment, seeking insurance coverage
for damage to third-parties' real property and buildings caused by asbestos release.
See id. at 1229. The United States Gypsum court based its decision on the plain lan-
guage of the excess policies' "other insurance" clause, holding that the clause "un-
equivocally sets forth that the excess insurer will not contribute 'if other valid and
collectible insurance with any other insurer is available to the insured.'" Id. at
1261 (quoting language of excess insurance policy). The United States Gypsum
court found the language of the other insurance clause indicated that the excess
policy was to "serve as an excess policy to all triggered primary policies, regardless
of whether they extend over multiple policy periods or [only] one." Id.
44. Id. at 1262. The United States Gypsum court concluded that if it permitted
the policyholder to recover from excess insurance policies upon the exhaustion of
a single primary policy, the policyholder could seek indemnification from its ex-
cess policies rather than from either itself as a primary self-insurer or from insol-
vent insurers in other triggered policy periods. See id. at 1261. The court further
noted that "[s]uch a practice would blur the distinction between primary and ex-
cess insurance, and would allow certain primary insurers to escape unscathed
when they would otherwise bear the initial burden of providing indemnification."
Id. at 1262 (citation omitted).
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the appellate court affirmed the trial court's adoption of horizontal
exhaustion. 45
C. "Vertical Exhaustion" or "Exhaustion by Years"
While horizontal exhaustion appears to be the dominant ex-
haustion theory courts apply, some courts have adopted a vertical
approach, particularly in recent decisions. 46 Vertical exhaustion, or
"exhaustion by years," is also known as "spiking" due to its precipi-
tous approach. That is, once a primary policy is exhausted, any re-
maining obligation shifts upward to the policy at the next level of
coverage that was on the risk for the same period. Specifically, ver-
tical exhaustion requires each excess policy in a triggered year to
contribute to indemnification as soon as its particular underlying
coverage is exhausted, even if other triggered primary policies (cov-
ering other periods) remain "untapped."
In Dayton Independent School District v. National Gypsum Co.,47
where asbestos property damage claims were at issue, the District
Court for the Eastern District of Texas adopted vertical exhaustion
and held that only the policies immediately underlying a given ex-
cess policy need be exhausted before the policyholder may call
upon that excess policy for indemnification. 48 The Dayton court
reasoned that because each triggered policy was required to indem-
nify the policyholder for its entire liability, up to its coverage limits,
the policyholder could select which triggered policy it wished to
provide coverage. 49 Consequently, vertical exhaustion permitted
the policyholder to designate the policy year that would cover the
45. See id.; accord Missouri Pac. R.R. Co. v. International Ins. Co., 679 N.E.2d
801, 810-11 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997) (applying horizontal exhaustion and holding that
policyholder must exhaust all underlying coverage prior to seeking coverage under
excess policies); Outboard Marine Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 670 N.E.2d 740,
755 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996) (holding that second-layer excess carrier was required to
indemnify policyholder only after exhaustion of primary and first-layer excess
policies).
46. See, e.g., UNR Indus., Inc. v. Continental Ins. Co., Nos. 85-C-3532, 83-A-
2523, 1988 WL 121574, at *12 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 9, 1988) (holding that "when under-
lying coverage is exhausted for any policy period, liability will exist under the terms
of an excess policy .... It is not necessary that underlying coverage be exhausted
for an entire policy period before any claim can be made against an excess car-
rier"); Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Aetna Cas. and Sur. Co., No. L-069351-97 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Aug. 7, 1998) (explaining that excess policy is triggered and liable to its
limits as soon as directly underlying policy is exhausted according to court); Illi-
nois Power Co. v. Home Ins. Co., No. 95-L-284 (Ill. Cir. Macon County Aug. 15,
1997) (finding that policy language gives insured right to exhaust vertically and
does not require policyholder to pay pro-rata damage for uninsured years).
47. 682 F. Supp. 1403 (E.D. Tex. 1988).
48. See id. at 1411 n.23.
49. See id. at 1411.
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loss and receive indemnification from excess insurers for that pe-
riod as the underlying policies were exhausted. 50 Notably, the Day-
ton court concluded that because the "other insurance" clauses the
excess policies contained related only to the rights of each carrier
against the others, the clauses did not limit the policyholder's right
to exhaust by years.5 1
IV. ALLOCATION OF INDEMNIFICATION OBLIGATIONS AMONG
MULTIPLE CARRIERS
When more than one policy period is triggered by a continu-
ous occurrence, a crucial determination is the manner in which
claims for indemnity should be allocated or apportioned among
the triggered policies.5 2 When an occurrence implicates multiple
policies, courts often use one of the following methods to allocate
indemnity obligations among insurers: (1) joint and several liabil-
ity;53 (2) pro-ration by years; 54 (3) pro-ration by years and limits; 55
or (4) pro-ration by exposure.56
A. 'Joint and Several" Liability
'Joint and several," or "all sums" liability, which policyholders
usually assert, allows recovery in full under any triggered policy of
the policyholders' choosing and leaves the selected insurer to pur-
sue cross-claims against other carriers whose policies were also avail-
able. Underjoint and several liability, any policy on the risk for any
50. See id. at 1411 & n.23; see also UNR Indus., Inc. v. Continental Ins. Co.,
Nos. 85-C-3532, 83-A-2523, 1988 WL 121574, at *20 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 9, 1988) (hold-
ing that " [policyholder] is entitled to look to excess and umbrella carriers for cov-
erage and indemnity after an underlying carrier has paid its limits for any annual
period and need not await full payment by a primary carrier for the entire policy
period").
51. See Dayton, 682 F. Supp. at 1411 n.21. The Dayton court explained that
"because no Carrier has filed a cross-claim in this action, the task of interpreting
the 'other insurance' clauses is not before the Court. Moreover, the 'other insur-
ance' clauses do not establish a basis for allocation to the insured." Id.
52. See Northern States Power Co. v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 523 N.W.2d 657, 665
(Minn. 1994) (stating, "[w]e do not expect that this case will be the 'last word' in
this area. Environmental liability insurance law, like any other area of law, will
have to develop over time and trial courts must be flexible in responding to new
fact situations.").
53. For a discussion of allocation under joint and several liability, see infra
notes 57-77 and accompanying text.
54. For a discussion of allocation under pro-ration by years, see infra notes 78-
87 and accompanying text.
55. For a discussion of allocation under pro-ration by years and limits, see
infra notes 88-99 and accompanying text.
56. For a discussion of allocation under pro-ration by exposure, see infra
notes 100-05 and accompanying text.
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portion of the period in which the insured sustained property dam-
age or bodily injury is jointly and severally obligated to respond in
full, up to its policy limits, for the loss. Courts applying joint and
several liability usually focus on a policy's "all sums" language,
which commonly states: "[t] he Company will pay on behalf of the
insured all sums which the insured shall become legally obligated
to pay."57 Once a policy is triggered, an insurer becomes liable for
all sums that it is legally obligated to pay, which may include those
sums attributable to bodily injury or property damage that did not
occur during the insurer's policy period. 58
The leading case adopting joint and several liability is Keene
Corp. v. Insurance Co. of North America.59 In Keene, a manufacturer
sought a declaratory judgment of its right to indemnification by its
CGL insurers for asbestos-related personal injury claims.60 The
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia held
that once a particular CGL policy is triggered, the insurer is re-
quired to fully indemnify the policyholder for the entire loss up to
its policy limits, even though part of the injury may have occurred
during another policy period or while the policyholder was unin-
sured.61 Because each policy issued from the date of initial inhala-
tion of asbestos to the date of manifestation of the injury was
57. For the full text of pertinent, typical CGL policy language, see supra notes
11-12 and accompanying text. Alternatively, some policies contain a substantially
similar clause that states that the insurer will pay the "entire liability," rather than
"all sums." Courts apply the same interpretation to either clause. See, e.g., Gilles-
pie, supra note 2, at 546 (using JH. France v. Allstate Ins. Co., 626 A.2d 502 (Pa.
1993), as example of manner in which court interprets these clauses).
58. See John H. Mathias, Jr. et al., Winner Take All - Or Nothing: Allocation
Issues in Insurance Claim Resolution, 11 No. 12 CoRe. CouNs. 1, May 1997, at *2
(contending that policy language "does not limit the insurer's duty to pay damages
to those that result from bodily injury or property damage that takes place during
the policy period").
59. 667 F.2d 1034 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
60. See id. at 1038. After being named as a co-defendant in over 6000 lawsuits
alleging injuries caused by exposure to its asbestos-containing thermal insulation
products, the policyholder sought coverage under CGL policies from four carriers
issued to it between 1961 and 1980. See id.
61. See id. at 1047. The Keene court reasoned that in a long-term damage
claim such as the one before it, when the policyholder is held liable for the entire
loss, only part of the injury will have developed during any single policy period. See
id. The court further stated, "[t] he issue that arises is whether an insurer is liable
in full, or in part, for [the policyholder's] liability once coverage is triggered." Id.
Relying on the "all sums" language in the policy, the Keene court concluded that
the insurer was liable in full, subject to contribution from other insurers as set out
in the policy's "other insurance" clause. See id. In so holding, the court declined
to characterize the insured's ultimate injury as resulting from a series of discrete
injuries, each confinable to an individual policy period. See id. Consequently, the
Keene court concluded that pro-ration by years allocation would be inappropriate.
See id.
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triggered, each insurer in Keene had a joint obligation to provide
the policyholder with full coverage. 62 Further, under Keene, the pol-
icyholder could seek indemnification from any of the triggered pol-
icies it chose, with the stipulation that only one policy's limits could
apply to each injury.63 Several courts, including the Third Cir-
cuit,64 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court,65 and other federal and
state courts, 6 6 have followed Keene in adopting joint and several
liability.
The Supreme Court of Washington followed Keene, without
wholly relying on its rationale, in deciding American National Fire
The court based its interpretation "on the terms of the policies themselves,"
explaining that the policyholder had a reasonable expectation that the function of
a CGL policy is to relieve the policyholder of all liability once the policy is trig-
gered. Id. at 1047-48. The Keene court further described this expectation as consis-
tent "with the ... underlying principles of the insurance policies at issue in [the]
case." Id. at 1048. "There is nothing in the policies that provides for a reduction
of the insurer's liability if an injury occurs only in part during a policy period." Id.
62. See id. at 1050. The Keene court stated that the only logical scheme for
allocation is for the policyholder "to be able to collect from any insurer whose
coverage is triggered, the full amount of indemnity that it is due . . . ." Id. The
court also found allocation by joint liability to be the only way to afford the policy-
holder the complete absolution from liability it expected from its CGL policies. See
id.
63. See id. at 1049-50 (emphasizing that "[t]he principle of indemnity implicit
in the policies .... does not require that [the policyholder] be entitled to 'stack'
applicable policies' limits of liability").
64. See, e.g., Koppers Co. v. Aetna Cas. and Sur. Co., 98 F.3d 1440,1449-56 (3d
Cir. 1996) (ruling that Pennsylvania law requires joint and several allocation of
environmental cleanup costs among multiple triggered insurance policies);
ACandS, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. and Sur. Co., 764 F.2d 968, 974 (3d Cir. 1985) (apply-
ingjoint and several liability and stating that "if a plaintiffs damages are caused in
part during an insured period, it is irrelevant to [the policyholder's] legal obliga-
tions and, therefore, to the insurer's liability that they were also caused, in part,
during another period").
65. See, e.g.,J.H. France Refractories Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 626 A.2d 502, 507
(Pa. 1993) (stating "[u]nder any given policy, the insurer contracted to pay all
sums which the insured becomes legally obligated to pay, not merely some pro rata
portion thereof").
66. See FMC Corp. v. Plaisted & Cos., 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 467, 497-503 (Mar. 3),
modified and reh'g denied (Mar. 27), review denied, (Cal. Ct. App. May 27, 1998) (al-
lowing insured to select which of multiple triggered policies would respond to
claim); Rubenstein v. Royal Ins. Co., 694 N.E.2d 381, 388 (Mass. App. Ct. 1998)
(affirming trial court's failure to allocate liability among insurers and thereby re-
jecting plaintiffs claim to allocate damages based on years of coverage); Benoy
Motor Sales, Inc. v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 679 N.E.2d 414, 416-19 (Ill.
App. Ct.), appeal denied, 686 N.E.2d 1158 (Ill. 1997) (reversing lower court's pro-
portional allocation of damages and finding that each policy triggered during con-
tinuous period of environmental contamination was jointly and severally liable);
Monsanto Co. v. C.E. Heath Compens. & Liab. Ins. Co., 652 A.2d 30, 33-35 (Del.
1994) (applying Missouri law and finding that absent specific policy provision for
pro-rata allocation, insurers' obligations were joint and several).
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Insurance Co. v. B & L Trucking and Construction Co.67 In B & L Truck-
ing, the court held that insurers' liability for continuous injury
losses is joint and several. 68 Consequently, the court concluded
that pollution cleanup costs need not be allocated between an in-
surer and its insured when the pollution occurred over a number of
years and the policyholder was uninsured for a portion of that pe-
riod.69 As in Keene, the B & L Trucking court found that the "all
sums" language of the policy warranted this interpretation. 70
In her dissenting opinion in B & L Trucking, Justice Madsen
highlighted her perceived shortcomings of the majority opinion by
succinctly stating, "[t] he majority requires the insurer in this case to
provide insurance coverage it neither contracted to provide nor re-
ceived insurance premiums for."71 Furthermore, according to Jus-
tice Madsen, the majority's construction of the "all sums" language
as suggesting joint and several liability was unreasonable. 72 Justice
Madsen concluded that in cases where environmental damage con-
tinues through insured and uninsured periods, it is illogical and
inappropriate to analogize insurance allocation to the tort concept
of joint and several liability.73
67. 951 P.2d 250 (Wash. 1998) (MadsenJ., dissenting).
68. See id. at 254-57.
69. See id.
70. See id. at 256-57. The B & L Trucking court rejected the insurer's argu-
ment that because the insured "expected" damage after a certain date, policies
triggered before that date could not be found liable for continuing damage after
that date. See id. at 255-56. Instead, the court found that once an occurrence
triggers a policy, the insurer is liable for all continuing damages flowing from the
triggering occurrence. See id. Moreover, the B & L Trucking court reasoned that
the insurer was a victim of its own policy language in that because the policy failed
to specify whether it provided joint and several or pro-ration coverage, it was am-
biguous and had to be construed against the drafter. See id. at 256-57. Also, "if
Northern intended solely to be liable on a pro rata basis it could have included
that language in its policy." Id. at 256. Further, the B & L Trucking court found
that neither principles of fairness nor public policy overcome this construction
against the insurer, as "because insurance policies are considered contracts, the
policy language, not public policy, controls." Id. at 257.
71. Id. Recall that the standard CGL policy requires insurers to pay for only
those injuries occurring "during the policy period." For the pertinent text of a
standard CGL policy, see supra note 12.
72. See B & L Trucking, 951 P.2d at 258. Justice Madsen found no ambiguity in
the policy, explaining:
Because the language of the policy as a whole does not obligate the in-
surer to pay any and all sums regardless of when the property damage
occurred and regardless of the relevant policy period, there is no ambigu-
ity to be construed in favor of the insured and against Northern
Insurance.
Id.
73. See id. at 259. Justice Madsen stated that "[a]n insured should not be able
to shift its responsibility for uninsured years to a carrier which did not contract to
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Several commentators have justly criticized joint and several li-
ability because it ignores "two of the most basic components of
every insurance policy, the duration of the policy period and limits
of liability. 74 Moreover, this method of apportionment purports to
extract relevant meaning from the "all sums" policy language, even
though "[t]he language was never intended to cover apportion-
ment when continuous injury occurs over multiple years. '7 5 Joint
and several liability also allows a policyholder to shift the risk of its
own bad bargain to those solvent excess carriers who happen to
have been on the risk during any triggered period. 76 Finally, this
provide coverage for that period of time." Id. (citing Stonewall Ins. Co. v. Asbestos
Claims Mgmt. Corp., 73 F.3d 1178 (2d Cir. 1995); Northern States Power Co. v.
Fidelity & Cas. Co. of N.Y., 523 N.W.2d 657 (Minn. 1994); Sharon Steel Corp. v.
Aetna Cas. and Sur. Co., 931 P.2d 127 (Utah 1997); Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. United
Ins. Co., 650 A.2d 974 (N.J. 1994)).
74. Shaun M. Baldwin & Dawn Midkiff, Apportioning Indemnity and Defense
Costs: The "Other Insurance" Clause and Other Theories of Allocation, in SELECTED ISSUES
IN INS. COVERAGE AND PRAC. (Defense Research Inst. 1990). Several courts' deci-
sions have criticized joint and several liability for essentially ignoring the duration
of the policy period and limits of liability in apportioning indemnification costs.
See, e.g., Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 633 F.2d 1212,
1225 (6th Cir. 1980) (stating that "[e]ach insurer is liable for its pro rata share.
The insurer's liability is not 'joint and several,' it is individual and proportion-
ate."); see also Outboard Marine Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 670 N.E.2d 740, 753
(I11. App. Ct. 1996) (rejecting joint and several liability as inconsistent with plain
language of policy).
75. Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. United Ins. Co., 650 A.2d 974, 989 (N.J. 1994). The
Owens-Illinois court commented that "to convert the 'all sums' or 'ultimate net loss'
language into the answer to apportionment when injury occurs over a period of
years is like trying to place one's hat on a rack that was never designed to hold it.
It does not work." Id. The court also noted that "the argument that all sums to be
assessed because of long-term exposure.., could have been established in any one
of the policy years is intuitively suspect. . . ." Id. Further, the Owens-Illinois court
found several "anomalies" to be present in the Keene court's application of joint
and several liability:
One anomaly in the Keene court's analysis is that a single claim for the
cost of cure of a long-term release of contaminants that polluted a city
water supply would be limited to one policy's limits, whereas if 300 resi-
dential wells were affected, the limits of multiple policies would be avail-
able, though the occurrence (cause) was the same. Another anomaly is
that although the opinion's premise is that all damages can be claimed in
any one of the years, it nonetheless calls for contribution from other poli-
cies. By definition, if all damages occurred in one of the years (in the
sense of that year's injury establishing the damages), none of the other
policies would be triggered.
Id. at 987. See also Montrose Chem. Co. v. Admiral Ins. Co., 913 P.2d 878, 903 (Cal.
1995) (rejecting joint and several liability, in part because of the "arbitrariness,
from the carrier's perspective, of telescoping all damage in a continuing injury
case in a single policy period").
76. Such a situation may arise in the case of a policyholder with a self-insured
retention, retrospective premium plans, one or more insolvent carriers, no cover-
age for significant periods or no coverage due to policy exclusions. See, e.g., Gen-
eral Refractories Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co., No. CIV. A.89-7924, 1994 WL 246375, at *7
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allocation scheme generates large transaction costs by requiring an
increased amount of litigation. 77
B. "Pro-Ration by Years"
Under "pro-ration by years," or "time on the risk," each trig-
gered policy bears a share of the total damages proportionate to the
number of years it was on the risk, relative to the total number of
years of triggered coverage. Significantly, pro-ration by years usu-
ally assigns loss without regard to the primary policies' limits of lia-
bility. For example, if a single continuing occurrence begins in
year one and ends in year ten, and there are ten one-year policies,
exactly one-tenth of the loss will be assigned to each policy.
Pro-ration by years rejects the basic premise ofjoint and several
liability; namely, that the "all sums" language makes a carrier liable
for the full amount of bodily injury or property damage if any por-
tion of the loss occurred during its policy period. Instead, courts
adopting pro-ration by years recognize that the definitions of "oc-
currence," "bodily injury" and "property damage," read in conjunc-
tion with the "Insuring Agreement," mandate that the allocation of
loss to a particular policy be proportionate to the damage suffered
during that policy's term. Due to the difficulty of establishing the
actual amount of loss sustained during an individual policy period,
however, these courts reason that a simple calculation based on
(E.D. Pa. June 8, 1994) (holding that underlying insurer's insolvency did not re-
quire excess insurer's coverage to "drop down").
77. See Doherty, supra note 1, at 271 (explaining that because of additional
litigation joint and several liability requires, that allocation method "does not solve
the allocation problem; it merely postpones it"). Joint and several allocation neces-
sitates the filing of cross-claims or subsequent actions to fairly determine carriers'
contributions. This approach results in the need for a second lawsuit in which the
insurer selected by the policyholder sues the other triggered insurers for
contribution.
In support of its rejection ofjoint and several liability, the Sixth Circuit stated
in Forty-Eight Insulations that "[tihe only thing on which all parties agree is that
there is a need for us to arrive at an administratively manageable interpretation of
the insurance policies - one that can be applied with minimal need for litiga-
tion." Forty-Eight Insulations, 633 F.2d at 1218. The court in Owens-Illinois similarly
highlighted that "[o]ne thing is certain: The present system is inefficient." Owens-
Illinois, 650 A.2d at 993. Further, the Owens-Illinois court emphasized that although
legal costs in environmental coverage litigation can represent as much as 70% of
total cleanup costs, "once the rules are settled, litigation costs may decline." Id.
(citation omitted). One commentator, however, asserts that CERCLA itself must
change before litigation costs can decrease. See Chris Roush, The Hurricane Called
Superfund: Cleanup Claims Could Hit $1 Trillion - and Batter Insurers, Bus. WK., Aug.
2, 1993, at 74 (noting that "[o]f the $15 billion that has already been spent on
Superfund cleanups [through 1993], roughly 75% has gone to legal fees and re-
lated costs . . . [a]nd fewer than 200 of the 1,300 sites have been cleaned.").
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time on the risk is the most equitable and efficient means of allocat-
ing indemnification obligations. 78
The seminal case adopting pro-ration by years is Insurance Co.
of North America v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc.,79 in which an asbestos-
related personal injury claim was at issue. 80 In Forty-Eight Insulations,
the Sixth Circuit held that indemnification and defense costs
should be "prorated . . . among all of the insurance companies
which were on the risk while the injured victim was breathing in
asbestos."81 Furthermore, the court concluded that the insured it-
self was to be treated as an insurer for those periods of time during
which it had no insurance coverage.8 2 Because the Forty-Eight Insu-
lations court found the insurers' liability to be "individual and pro-
portionate," as opposed to 'Joint and several," it ruled that an
insurer would not be liable for years in which there could not have
been any exposure to asbestos that its insured manufactured.8 3 The
Sixth Circuit explained its holding by stating, "[g] iven the impossi-
bility in most cases of ascertaining which company provided asbes-
78. Pro-ration by years offers several potential benefits. First, it spreads the
risk to the maximum number of carriers and to the policyholder for those periods
in which the policyholder was uninsured. Second, once the total amount of loss is
established, pro-rations by years requires only a relatively simple calculation for
allocating indemnification obligations. In light of the costs of insurance litigation
in these matters, this ease in application is a substantial consideration. For an
estimate of litigation costs in environmental cases, see supra notes 3 & 78 and ac-
companying text. Third, pro-ration by years alleviates the subsequent contribution
actions between the various carriers thatjoint and several liability among the insur-
ers necessarily requires. For a discussion of additional litigation under joint and
several liability, see supra note 77 and accompanying text.
79. 633 F.2d 1212 (6th Cir. 1980).
80. See id. at 1213-14.
81. Id. at 1224, 1226. Addressing the insurance companies' concerns that
pro-ration by years would create problems with coverage "stacking," the Sixth Cir-
cuit affirmed the district court's holding limiting the total amount a carrier would
be required to pay. See id. at 1226 n.28. The Forty-Eight Insulations court also stated
that "[i] n any event, no insurer should be held liable in any one case to indemnify
[the policyholder] for judgment liability for more than the highest single yearly
limit in a policy that existed during the period of the claimant's exposure for
which judgment was obtained." Id. (citation omitted).
82. See id. at 1224, 1226 (illustrating by stating that "if insurer A provided 3
years of coverage, insurer B an additional 3 years, and the manufacturer was unin-
sured for the remaining 3 years, liability would be allocated at 1/3 for each of the
three concerns").
83. Id. at 1225. The Forty-Eight Insulations court noted that an insurer would
similarly not be liable for years in which a worker used an effective respirator. See
id. In support of its refusal to impose liability on the insurer for those years, the
court highlighted that "no bodily injury resulting from [the policyholder's] prod-
ucts took place during the years in question." Id.
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tos products in different years, we think that this is the fairest way to
apportion liability."8 4
Among the courts that have followed the Sixth Circuit's lead in
adopting pro-ration by years are the United States Courts of Ap-
peals for the Second and Fifth Circuits,85 the Supreme Court of
Minnesota 6 and several other federal and state courts.8 7 The ma-
jor flaw of pro-ration by years, however, is that it fails to consider
the limits of each policy. Therefore, a policy with very low limits of
liability may be liable for the same amount as a policy with much
greater limits, despite the likely disparity in the premium that the
respective carriers collected from the policyholder.
C. "Pro-Ration by Years and Limits"
As the name suggests, "pro-ration by years and limits" allocates
indemnification among policies based on both the number of years
a policy is on the risk as well as that policy's limits of liability. The
basis of an individual insurer's liability is the aggregate coverage it
underwrote during the period in which the loss occurred. 88 Basi-
cally, a given insurer's liability is determined by comparing its par-
ticular exposure to the total amount of exposure assumed by all
84. Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 633 F.2d 1212,
1225 (6th Cir. 1988).
85. See, e.g., Stonewall Ins. Co. v. Asbestos Claims Mgmt. Corp., 73 F.3d 1178,
1191 (2d Cir. 1995) (approving district court's application of pro-ration by years
allocation of damages); Porter v. American Optical Corp., 641 F.2d 1128, 1145
(5th Cir. 1981) (citing Insurance Co. of North America v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc.,
633 F.2d 1212 (6th Cir. 1980), and holding that liability should be pro-rated
among all carriers). In Porter, the Fifth Circuit also recognized that no insurer
would be liable for periods when there could not have been exposure. See id. at
1145.
86. See, e.g., Northern States Power Co. v. Fidelity and Cas. Co., 523 N.W.2d
657, 662-63 (Minn. 1994) (rejectingjoint and several liability in favor of pro-ration
by years in soil and groundwater contamination case).
87. See, e.g., Olin Corp. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 972 F. Supp. 189, 202
(S.D.N.Y. 1997) (describing pro-ration by years as "a practical approach, although
not a literal application of the insurance terms"); Lafarge Co. v. National Union
Fire Ins. Co., 935 F. Supp. 675, 689 (D. Md. 1996) (applying injury-in-fact trigger
and allocating liability pro-rata by time on risk); Stonewall Ins. Co. v. City of Palos
Verdes Estates, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 176, 208 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996) (ordering lower
court to apportion indemnity fairly among insurers, but strongly suggesting "quali-
fied time on the risk" approach); Outboard Marine Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co.,
670 N.E.2d 740, 748 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996) (holding that environmental damages
must be apportioned pro-ration by years among excess insurers, beginning with
first layer excess policies); Conductron Corp. v. American Employer's Ins. Co.,
Nos. 93-E-149, 93-C-599 (N.H. Super. Ct. Mar. 4, 1997) (allocating loss uniformly
to insurers, and policyholder for uninsured periods, throughout exposure period).
88. For an example of the application of pro-ration by years and limits to the
allocation of liability, see infra note 89. For an example of the application of pro-
ration by years and limits to the allocation of defense costs, see infra note 112.
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carriers of the triggered policies. This comparison yields a percent-
age that is then applied to the amount of loss the policyholder
sustained.89
The seminal case adopting pro-ration by years and limits is
Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. United Insurance Co.90 In Owens-Illinois, the poli-
cyholder sought indemnification from several primary and um-
brella excess carriers for tens of thousands of asbestos-related
personal injury and property damage claims.91 Applying a continu-
ous trigger of coverage, the New Jersey Supreme Court ordered an
allocation based on each policy's years and limits. 9 2 Finding that
the policies failed to consider coverage cases involving long-term,
mass-exposure toxic torts,93 the Owens-Illinois court found it neces-
89. The following illustrates application of pro-ration by years and limits:
For each of the years 1993 and 1994, Insurance Company A (Company A)
provided XYZ Chemical Company (XYZ) with general liability insurance under a
one-year policy with a $1 million limit of liability. For 1995, Insurance Company B
(Company B) provided XYZ with general liability insurance under a one-year pol-
icy with a $3 million limit of liability. From the beginning of 1993 through the end
of 1995, toxic substances leaked from XYZ's factory (assume that none of XYZ's
CGL policies contained a pollution exclusion clause). The state in which XYZ was
located ordered remediation of the soil surrounding the factory, which cost XYZ
$1 million. XYZ requested indemnification from Companies A and B, which sub-
sequently disagreed regarding their respective obligations and sought declaratory
relief. The court applies a continuous trigger of coverage, implicating all three of
XYZ's general liability policies, and also decides that a pro-rata by years and limits
approach is the most equitable means of allocating indemnification obligations
among the insurers.
The amount of each insurer's indemnification obligation is calculated as fol-
lows. The total indemnity potentially due to XYZ from Company A is $2 million
($1.million limit x 2 years). The total indemnity potentially due to XYZ from Com-
pany B is $3 million ($3 million limit x 1 year). Thus, the sum of all indemnity
potentially available to XYZ from Companies A and B is $5 million. Under pro-
ration by years and limits, Company A would be responsible for two-fifths, or 40%,
of the obligation ($2 million aggregate limit + $5 million aggregate potential).
Company A's proportion, 40%, is multiplied by the policyholder's total claim of $1
million to yield an allocation to Company A of $400,000. Company B's propor-
tion, 60% ($3 million aggregate limit + $5 million aggregate potential), is multi-
plied by the total claim, yielding an allocation to Company B of $600,000.
Therefore, Companies A and B would assume indemnification obligations of
$400,000 and $600,000, respectively, under pro-ration by years and limits.
90. 650 A.2d 974 (N.J. 1994).
91. See id. at 978. Prior to filing its briefs with the Ownes-llinois court, the
policyholder "had settled 43,000 bodily-injury lawsuits... [and] more than 90,000
bodily-injury and 63 property-damage cases were pending." Id. In addition, bod-
ily-injury suits were accumulating with the policyholder at a rate of 1700 per
month, and the policyholder's unreimbursed costs of defending and settling the
cases had already reached $105 million. See id.
, 92. See id. at 984-85, 993.
93. See id. at 988. From an insurance litigation standpoint, cases of this type
are similar to long-term environmental damage cases.
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sary to look to public policy for guidance.94 The court noted that
the principal consideration was to make "the most efficient use of
the resources available to cope with environmental disease or dam-
age."95 Also, recognizing straight annual progression as an inap-
propriate approach to allocation, the Owens-Illinois court rejected
pro-ration by years.96 Instead, it concluded that allocation among
insurance carriers, and potentially the policyholder, should be "on
the basis of the extent of the risk assumed, i.e., proration on the
basis of policy limits, multiplied by years of coverage. '9 7
94. See id. at 992. The court in Owens-Illinois stated that it was simply "unable
to find the answer to allocation in the language of the policies." Id. at 990. Fur-
thermore, the court found little guidance in "the other usual principles of inter-
pretation of contracts." Id. at 991. Although the Owens-Illinois court considered
the doctrines of strict construction and contra proferentem, as well as the objec-
tively reasonable expectations of the policyholder and retroactive imposition of
absolute liability under CERCLA, it found that the results under those considera-
tions would be inconsistent. See id. The court also noted that "[tlo have shifting
rules of interpretation that depend on the configuration of insurance coverage is
unacceptable .... Therefore, the public interest factors... serve to guide us." Id.
at 991-92.
95. Owens-Illinois v. United Ins. Co., 650 A.2d 974, 992 (N.J. 1994). For in-
stance, regarding self-insurance, the Owens-Illinois court observed that because the
insurance industry can most efficiently spread the costs of damage, the law should
create an incentive for parties to acquire insurance. See id. Consequently, for the
periods in which the policyholder opted not to obtain insurance, the Owens-Illinois
court held that it chose to become a risk-bearer and should share in the allocation
of damages. See id. at 992-93. The court explained:
Almost all such insurance controversies are retrospective, and to reflect
now on what might have been done if the parties had contemplated to-
day's problem is almost fatuous. Our job, however, is not just to solve
today's problems but to create incentives that will tend to minimize their
recurrence .... Future actors would know that if they do not transfer to
insurance companies the risk of their activities that cause continuous and
progressive injury, they may bear that untransferred risk.
Id. at 992.
96. See id. at 993. The Owens-Illinois Court supported its rejection of pro-ra-
tion by years and limits by observing the failure of the approach to "relate the
theory of a continuous trigger causing indivisible injury to the degree of risk trans-
ferred or retained in each of the years of repeated exposure to the injurious condi-
tions." Id. The court also implicitly advocated pro-ration by exposure in cases
where the amount of injury that occurred in each policy period is ascertainable.
See id. at 987-88, 993. Noting the difficulty in ascertaining that amount, however,
the Owens-Illinois court stated, "any allocation should be in proportion to the de-
gree of the risks transferred or retained during the years of exposure." Id. at 993.
For a discussion of pro-ration by exposure, see infra notes 100-05 and accom-
panying text.
97. Id. In allocating the costs of indemnification and defense, the Owens-Illi-
nois court concluded that it naturally follows that policy limits and exclusions must
be considered in determining allocation. See id. at 994. Notably, the court did not
specify how pro-ration by years and limits was actually to be developed and applied,
stating:
We realize that many complexities encumber the solution that we suggest
involving, as it does, proration by time and degree of risk assumed - for
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Several other courts have adopted pro-ration by years and lim-
its in apportioning liability.98 A major criticism of pro-ration by
years and limits is, however, that insurers with higher limits may be
liable for a disproportionate share of damages based solely on their
limits.99
D. "Pro-Ration by Exposure"
Under "pro-ration by exposure," courts attempt to apportion
liability to each policy period in accordance with the amount of
injury or property damage that can be attributed to that specific
policy period. The premise of pro-ration by exposure approach is
that a CGL policy is required to pay only for bodily injury or prop-
erty damage taking place during the policy period.
The leading case applying pro-ration by exposure is Uniroyal,
Inc. v. Home Insurance Co.100 In Uniroyal, a manufacturer of Agent
Orange herbicides sought reimbursement from its insurers for both
its share of the settlement of the underlying class action litigation as
well as for defense costs.' 01 The Uniroyal court applied an injury-in-
example, determining how primary and excess coverage is to be taken
into account or the order which policies are triggered .... Still, we do
not believe that the issues are unmanageable .... [T]he legal system
"frequently resolves issues involving considerable uncertainty."
Id. (citations omitted). The Owens-Illinois court further noted that lower courts
should allow for development of a formula by a "master, one skilled in the eco-
nomics of insurance." Id. See also Atlantic Mut. Ins. Co. v. Truck Ins. Exch., 797
F.2d 1288, 1296 (5th Cir. 1986) (affirming lower court's decision to consider re-
spective policy limits in determining liability); Armstrong World Indus., Inc. v.
Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d 690, 715 (Cal. App. Ct. 1996) (adopting
"non-traditional" allocation approach based on policy limits multiplied by years of
coverage after concluding this method was consistent with "other insurance"
clause providing for pro-ration by "applicable limit of liability").
98. See, e.g., Owens-Illinois v. United Ins. Co., 650 A.2d 974, 993 (N.J. 1994)
(stating, "[t]hat later insurers might need to respond to pre-policy occurrences is
not unfair. 'These are "occurrence" policies which, by their nature, provide cover-
age for pre-policy occurrences (acts) which cause injury or damage during the
policy period.'") (quoting Montrose Chem. Corp. v. Admiral Ins. Co., 5 Cal Rptr.
2d 358, 367 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992), affd, 913 P.2d 878 (Cal. 1995)). But see Insur-
ance Co. of Tex. v. Employers Liberty Assurance Corp., 163 F. Supp. 143 (S.D. Cal.
1958) (apportioning damages resulting from automobile accident based on premi-
ums paid to each insurer).
99. See, e.g., Northern States Power Co. v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 523 N.W.2d 657,
662 (Minn. 1994) (stating pro-ration by years and limits "effectively makes those
insurers with higher limits liable for damages incurred outside their policy periods
and is therefore inconsistent with the actual injury trigger theory [which says that
each insurer is only liable for damages that occurred during its policy period]").
100. 707 F. Supp. 1368 (E.D.N.Y. 1988).
101. See id. at 1369-70. In the action underlying Uniroya/ a class of 2.5 million
Vietnam War veterans and their family members sued the United States and the
manufacturers of Agent Orange. See id. at 1369. Between 1961 and 1971, the
United States military sprayed 17-19 million gallons of Agent Orange over approxi-
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fact trigger and the parties stipulated that any injury resulting from
exposure to Agent Orange took place at, or shortly after, a service-
man's exposure to Agent Orange.10 2 Based on the case's enormous
record, the Uniroyal court determined that the damages should be
allocated between the policies in proportion to the respective vol-
ume of Agent Orange that the policyholder delivered to the mili-
tary during each policy year.10 3 The Uniroyal court found that the
pro-ration by exposure allocation scheme was "the only one that
comport[ed] with the language of the policies."' 0 4
Several other courts have used pro-ration by exposure to ap-
portion damages among multiple policies.10 5 It may, however, be
mately ten percent of the total land area of South Vietnam. See id. at 1370. It is
likely that over 20,000 aerial spray sorties were flown and many additional coats
were applied with hand-held sprayers. See id. The plaintiffs in the underlying ac-
tion alleged that exposure to Agent Orange caused cancers, genetic damage and
birth defects, skin diseases and nervous disorders and settled their claim when
seven manufacturers agreed to pay the class $180 million. See id. The policyholder
in Uniroyal sought reimbursement for its share of the settlement, $9 million, and
for its defense costs, $3 million. Id.
102. See id. at 1389. The Uniroyal court distinguished the "occurrence," which
created liability on the part of the policyholder, from the "injury," which triggered
the policy. See id. at 1387. Uniroyal's deliveries of Agent Orange to the military
were held to constitute a single, continuous "occurrence," even though the deliv-
eries were made over the course of 16 months. See id. at 1383, 1385, 1389. Regard-
ing the injury, the Uniroyal court stated, "[i] n this case there can be no doubt when
[it] must be deemed to have taken place .. '.. [F] or the purposes of this insurance
litigation.., injury in fact took place within a week or so of spraying." Id. at 1389.
Further, based on "the information gleaned from years of Agent Orange proceed-
ings in this court," the Uniroyal court deduced that the injury in fact occurred
approximately four months after Uniroyal delivered Agent Orange to the United
States military. Id. Consequently, because one continuous occurrence, covering
two policy periods, caused the injury in fact, both policies were triggered and the
net losses therefore needed to be apportioned among the insurers. See id. at 1391.
103. See id. at 1392. To calculate the proportional loss under each policy from
the records of delivery dates and quantities, the Uniroyal court held that "[g]al rons
may be used as a proxy for exposure ... and exposure may be used as a proxy for
injury." Id. at 1393.
104. Id. at 1392. Although the Uniroyal court described the policies as "nearly
silent on the allocation issue and [providing] only scant assistance in determining
the allocation of numerous injuries from a continuous occurrence," it found "indi-
cia" in them suggesting that a proportional allocation based on exposure was ap-
propriate. Id. For example, the court noted that each policy was worded to
provide coverage only for injuries that actually triggered that policy. See id. In
addition, the "other insurance" clauses of the policies suggested a proportional
allocation. See id. at 1393.
105. See, e.g., Diamond Shamrock Chem. Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 609
A.2d 440, 467 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1992) (finding that pro-ration by expo-
sure, based on New York law as created by Uniroyal court, was appropriate in subse-
quent Agent Orange case); Boeing Co. v. Aetna Cas. and Sur. Co., No. C86-
352WD, 1991 WL 575712, at *2 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 16, 1991) (ruling that damages
insurer caused by depositing industrial waste at two sites should be allocated in
proportion to annual waste deliveries to each site); Northwest Steel Rolling Mills
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difficult for courts to apply this approach because it requires a fac-
tual basis for quantifying the damages.
V. ALLOCATION OF DEFENSE COSTS
A. Background
If a court determines that more than one policy is triggered by
a single, continuous occurrence, a related and potentially costly is-
sue is apportionment of defense costs among the parties involved.
Often, carriers involved in these types of cases informally agree to
share the underlying defense costs, pending a determination of de-
fense responsibility in the coverage action. 10 6 Thus, the allocation
of defense costs is commonly based on the same theory as the allo-
cation of indemnity obligations. 10 7
B. Methods of Allocation of Defense Costs
Where allocation of defense costs is permitted, courts usually
use one of the following methods in a concurrent coverage situa-
tion: (1) pro-ration by years;108 (2) pro-ration by years and limits;10 9
or (3) equal shares. 110 Under pro-ration by years, defense costs are
allocated to all triggered policies in proportion to each policy's
time on the risk for the single, continuing occurrence."1 Differ-
Liquidating Trust v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., No. C86-376WD, 1991 WL 639662, at
*6 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 27, 1991) (ruling that policyholder's damages could be ap-
portioned over 14-year period in proportion to volume of waste shipped in each
year, but holding policyholder liable for years in which it expected or intended
damage).
106. Contrary to the practice of some insurance companies, in situations
where the insurers are unable to agree on an allocation scheme, it is dangerous for
a carrier to take the position that, although it has a duty to defend the insured, it
will only pay a per year pro-rata share of the defense costs.
107. See, e.g., Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 667 F.2d 1034, 1050
(D.C. Cir. 1981) (explaining that because each insurer is fully liable to its insured,
each is similarly fully liable for defense costs); Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-
Eight Insulations, Inc., 633 F.2d 1212, 1225 (6th Cir. 1980) (holding that "indem-
nity costs can be allocated by the number of years [of exposure, and] ... [t] here is
no reason why this same theory should not apply to defense costs").
108. For a discussion of allocation of defense costs under pro-ration by years,
see infra note 111 and accompanying text.
109. For a discussion of allocation of defense costs under pro-ration by years
and limits, see infra note 112 and accompanying text.
110. For a discussion of allocation of defense costs under equal shares, see
infra notes 113-14 and accompanying text.
111. See, e.g., Gulf Chem. & Metallurgical Corp. v. Associated Metals & Miner-
als Corp., 1 F.3d 365, 372 (5th Cir. 1993) (noting that "insurers need not provide
separate defenses, but may be compelled by the insured to share in the cost of
providing a complete defense"); Forty-Eight Insulations, 633 F.2d at 1226 (finding
pro-ration by years to be appropriate allocation method because although insurer
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endy, under pro-ration by years and limits, an individual insurer's
liability for defense costs is determined by dividing its aggregate
policy limits (for all the years it was on the risk for the single, con-
tinuing occurrence) by the aggregate policy limits of all the avail-
able policies and then multiplying that percentage by the amount
of total defense costs. 112 Last, some courts have followed an equal
shares or per capita approach, regardless of each triggered policy's
limits or amount of time on the risk.113 Courts applying this ap-
proach reason that because each carrier has a duty to defend, they
should share that obligation equally. 114
contracted to pay entire cost of defending claim arising within policy period, it did
not contract to pay defense costs for occurrences taking place outside policy pe-
riod); Continental Cas. Co. v. Medical Protective Co., 859 S.W.2d 789, 792 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1993) (explaining that defense costs are inevitable part of claim for dam-
ages and should be apportioned in same manner as settlement for claim of
damages).
112. See, e.g., Continental Cas. Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 823 F.2d 708, 712
(2d Cir. 1987) (commenting that "no method of apportioning liability is entirely
satisfactory"); Cooper Lab., Inc. v. International Surplus Lines Ins. Co., 802 F.2d
667, 676 (3d Cir. 1986) (noting that "the district court should allocate the fees
expended to reflect the [parties'] respective interests"); American States Ins. Co. v.
Angstman Motors, Inc., 343 F. Supp. 576, 587 (D. Mont. 1972) (concluding that
"regardless of the outcome of the judgment or settlement, if any, [the insurer]
must contribute its pro-rata share of the defense costs"); Sharon Steel Corp. v.
Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 931 P.2d 127, 140 (Utah 1997) (finding this approach most
equitable because "it better reflects what each insurer contracted to provide").
For example, assume a single, continuous occurrence triggers three primary
policies: (1) policy A has limits of $1 million for one year; (2) policy B has limits of
$2 million a year for two years; and (3) policy C has limits of $5 million for one
year. The total amount of defense costs for a single occurrence taking place from
the beginning of year one through the end of year four is $2 million. Under pro-
ration by years and limits, the defense costs would be allocated as follows:
Policy A: $ 200,000 ($1 mil. + $10 mil. x $2 mil.);
Policy B: $ 800,000 ($4 mil. + $10 mil. x $2 mil.);
Policy C: $1,000,000 ($5 mil. + $10 mil. x $2 mil.).
113. See, e.g., New York v. Blank, 27 F.3d 783, 788-89 (2d Cir. 1994) (finding
that policies' "other insurance" and contribution clauses required contribution to
defense costs by equal shares); United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Executive Ins.
Co., 893 F.2d 517, 520 (2d Cir. 1990) (finding policy's language legally obligated
insurers to "contribute in equal shares to defense"); Federal Ins. Co. v. Cablevision
Sys. Dev. Co., 836 F.2d 54, 57-58 (2d Cir. 1987) (ruling that although policies'
"other insurance" and contribution clauses address indemnification only, they
demonstrate insurers' intent to similarly apportion defense costs); Atlantic Mut.
Ins. Co. v. Truck Ins. Exch., 797 F.2d 1288, 1296 n.6 (5th Cir. 1986) (affirming
district court's decision that applied equal shares allocation of defense costs); Pa-
cific Indem. Co. v. Linn, 766 F.2d 754, 765 n.2 (3d Cir. 1985) (focusing on rules of
interpretation for contractual language in determination of insurers' ability to pay
defense costs); Argonaut Ins. Cos. v. Medical Liab. Mut. Ins. Co., 760 F. Supp.
1078, 1086 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (apportioning defense costs equally regardless of
amount of premium insurer received from defendant).
114. See, e.g., Atlantic Mut., 797 F.2d at 1296 n.6 (explaining that "[b]ecause
Truck and Atlantic had equal obligations to defend [the policyholder], defense
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VI. ORPHAN SHARES
A. Background
One of the most hotly litigated allocation issues is whether the
policyholder must assume responsibility for gaps in coverage that
can arise in various circumstances. 115 Although the previous discus-
sions of allocation of indemnity payments and defense costs ad-
dress, to some extent, the allocation of these "orphan shares," the
issue is worrisome enough to both the insurer and the insured to
merit a brief, independent analysis.
B. Indemnification Obligations of Orphan Shares
1. Courts Requiring Apportionment to the Insured
Courts imposing liability for orphan shares on the policyholder
have often done so with the logic that the policyholder willingly, or
through misfortune, "self-insured," and therefore must be held re-
sponsible for all risk in that period. 1 6 For example, in Uniroyal, Inc.
v. Home Insurance Co.," 7 the District Court for the Eastern District
of New York allocated liability for uninsured periods to the insured,
observing that "[a] firm that fails to purchase insurance for a pe-
riod . . . is self-insuring for all the risk incurred in that period;
costs should be apportioned equally between them"); Cablevision, 836 F.2d at 57
(stating, "each insurer had an equal and unlimited duty to defend").
115. There are five scenarios that often lead to gaps in insurance coverage.
First, after assessing potential risk, the policyholder may make a conscious business
decision to not purchase insurance for a certain time period. Second, an unin-
sured period may occur where the policyholder selected a carrier that subse-
quently became insolvent. Third, there may be periods for which the policyholder
is unable to prove the existence, terms and conditions of its policies. Fourth, an
exclusion or limitation may preclude coverage for a specific risk. Fifth, insurance
may be unavailable because of market conditions or statutory mandates.
The reasons for which a policyholder does not have responsive insurance for
certain time periods can be significant in litigation. See, e.g., E.I. DuPont de
Nemours & Co. v. Admiral Ins. Co., Civ. A. No. 89C-AU-99, 1995 WL 654020, at *16
(Del. Super. Ct. Oct. 27, 1995) (highlighting absence of coverage as relevant to
determination of policyholder's liability for uninsured period). Alternatively, it is
arguably illogical to consider such factors, because whatever the reason for the
gap, making insurers pay for uninsured periods through allocation makes them
liable for damages incurred outside their policy periods.
116. See, e.g., Stonewall Ins. Co. v. Asbestos Claims Mgmt. Corp., 73 F.3d 1178,
1203 (2d Cir. 1995); modified, 85 F.3d 49 (2d Cir. 1996) (explaining that for these
periods the policyholder either opted to not obtain insurance or failed to procure
adequate coverage).
117. 707 F. Supp. 1368 (E.D.N.Y. 1988). For a discussion of the facts of Uni-
royal, see supra notes 100-05 and accompanying text.
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otherwise, it would be receiving coverage for a period for which it
paid no premium. Self-insurance is called 'going bare'for a reason."1 18
Similarly, in Stonewall Insurance Co. v. Asbestos Claims Manage-
ment Corp.,119 the Second Circuit allocated orphan shares to the pol-
icyholder.1 20 The Stonewall court stated that "proration-to-the-
insured is a sensible way to adjust the competing contentions of the
parties in the context of continuous triggering of multiple policies
over an extended span of years." 121 The court thus held that alloca-
tion to the insured is appropriate for periods in which the insured
either chose not to purchase coverage or obtained insufficient cov-
erage. 122 Where the period of self-insurance resulted from circum-
stances entirely beyond the policyholder's control, however, the
Stonewall court found it inappropriate to apportion liability to the
insured. 23 Consequently, the court refused to apply "proration-to-
the-insured" to policy years when asbestos liability insurance was un-
available to insureds because of uniform application of asbestos ex-
clusions. 124 In recent years, the courts in several federal and state
cases have apportioned liability for orphan shares to policyholders,
generally applying the same rationale as the Uniroyal and Stonewall
courts.
1 2 5
118. Id. at 1392 (emphasis added) (citing Developments in the Law - Toxic Waste
Litigation VIII: Bankruptcy and Insurance Issues, 99 I-IRv. L. REv. 1458, 1584 (1986)).
119. 73 F.3d 1178 (2d Cir. 1995), modified, 85 F.3d 49 (2d Cir. 1996).
120. See id. at 1203.
121. Id.
122. See id. As the district court explained in Stonewalt
It was [the insured] that chose to place its insurance with those compa-
nies which are now insolvent, and [the insured] that bargained away cov-
erage by accepting asbestos exclusion clauses. There is no possible
justification for shifting the economic consequences of [the insured's]
decision to the remaining insurers. Relying on social policy to justify im-
puting an expectation of complete coverage to the insured is legally...
insupportable.
Stonewall Ins. Co. v. National Gypsum Co., No. 86-CIV-9671, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
8898, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. June 22, 1992).
123. See Stonewall, 73 F.3d at 1203.
124. See id. (reasoning that, unlike situations where insured voluntarily de-
clined to purchase insurance or purchased insufficient amounts, insureds were not
afforded choice of acquiring asbestos coverage after 1985).
125. See, e.g., Outboard Marine Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 670 N.E.2d 740,
748-49 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996) (allocating liability pro-ration by years and holding that
policyholder was responsible for pro-rata share for periods of no insurance or self-
insurance). The Outboard Marine court noted that if liability were not allocated to
the policyholder, the policyholder could "'avoid absorbing the cost resulting from
its position as a self-insurer in the other triggered policy periods .... .'" Id. at 748
(quoting United States Gypsum Co. v. Admiral Ins. Co., 643 N.E.2d 1226, 1261
(Ill. App. Ct. 1994)); see also Domtar, Inc. v. Niagara Fire Ins. Co., 552 N.W.2d 738,
745 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996), rev'd in part on other grounds, 563 N.W.2d 724 (Minn.
1997) (affirming trial court's pro-rata allocation to policyholder for periods during
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2. Courts Rejecting Apportionment to the Insured
Some courts have refused to assign orphan shares to the policy-
holder. These courts reason that a gap in coverage is not
equivalent to self-insurance. 126 Consequently, they hold that such a
concept should not be grafted onto the policies.127
The most significant case to reject apportionment to the poli-
cyholder is also the seminal case adopting ajoint-and-several alloca-
tion of indemnification obligations: Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of
North America.128 In declining to apportion orphan shares to the
insured, the Keene court explained:
We have no authority upon which to pretend that [the in-
sured] also has a "self-insurance" policy that is triggered
for periods in which no other policy was purchased. Even
if we had the authority, what would we pretend that the
policy provides? What would its limits be? There are no
self-insurance policies, and we respectfully submit that the
contracts before us do not support the judicial creation of
such additional insurance policies. 129
which it did not have responsive insurance). In holding that the trial court could
allocate liability to the policyholder "for damage during periods of time when [the
policyholder] could not establish coverage," the Domtar appellate court closely fol-
lowed the reasoning of the Minnesota Supreme Court in Northern States Power
Co. v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 523 N.W.2d 657 (Minn. 1994). See Domtar, 552
N.W.2d at 743. The Domtar court found that, under the Northern States Power deci-
sion, the supreme court clearly approved of distributing damage from the initial
point of contamination to the end of the last self-insured period, thereby including
the periods in which there was no insurance. See id. at 744.
Accord Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Sepco Corp., 918 F.2d 920, 924 (11th
Cir. 1990) (finding as reasonable district court's holding that each entity was only
responsible for pro-rata share of defense costs and making Sepco responsible for
these costs when it was uninsured); NL Indus., Inc. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co.,
926 F. Supp. 446, 465-66 (applying New York law and explaining that pro-rata ap-
proach is preferred method of sharing); E.R. Squibb & Sons v. Accident & Cas.
Co., 860 F. Supp. 124, 127 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) ("Pro rata sharing of cost among carri-
ers is appropriate and called for to avoid placing any carrier at a special disadvan-
tage, perhaps as a settlement device commonly employed in cases involving joint
and several liability to induce a rush to settle early in the course of a litigation.");
Northern States Power Co. v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 523 N.W.2d 657, 664 (Minn.
1994) (stating that "insured bears the burden of proving the total amount of dam-
ages for which coverage may exist"); Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. United Ins. Co., 650
A.2d 974, 995 (NJ. 1994) (holding that where company chose to retain risk by
being uninsured, company will be factored into allocation formula as risk-bearer).
126. See, e.g., J.H. France Refractories Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 626 A.2d 502,
508 (Pa. 1993) (concluding that to treat uninsured periods as self-insured periods is to
"create a judicial fiction which cannot be supported").
127. See id.
128. 667 F.2d 1034 (D.C. Cir. 1981). For a discussion of the facts of Keene, see
supra notes 60-63 and accompanying text.
129. Id. at 1048-49.
1999]
29
Jones and Hurwitz: An Introduction to Insurance Allocation Issues in Multiple-Trigge
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1999
54 VILLANOVA ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOuRNAL
Although several state courts have followed Keene in refusing to as-
sign liability for coverage gaps to the policyholder, 130 such holdings
yield not only unfair results for insurers, but also adverse public
policy consequences.13 1
C. Assignment of Defense Costs
Even when a court requires an insured to pay a portion of the
damages, the question of whether the insured must also pay a por-
tion of defense costs sometimes remains. The leading pre-Owens-
Illinois case assigning orphan shares of defense costs to a policy-
holder is Insurance Co. of North America v. Forty-Eight Insulations,
Inc.132 In Forty-Eight Insulations, the Sixth Circuit reasoned that be-
cause the insurer contracted to pay the cost of defending only those
claims that arose within the policy period, the policyholder was re-
quired to pay for the defense of the non-covered risk.' 33 Although
several other federal and state courts have similarly apportioned de-
130. SeeJH. France Refractories, 626 A.2d at 508 (relying heavily on Keene in
concluding that uninsured and self-insured periods are not equivalent); Arm-
strong World Indus., Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d 690 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1996) (holding that policyholders did not have an obligation to pay pro-rata
share for any uninsured or self-insured periods of time).
131. See Owens-Illinois v. United Ins. Co., 650 A.2d 974, 991-992 (N.J. 1994)
(explaining that "[b]ecause insurance companies can spread costs throughout an
industry and thus achieve cost efficiency, the law should, at a minimum, not pro-
vide disincentives to parties to acquire insurance."). One commentator asserts that
allowing policyholders to avoid responsibility for uninsured periods fails to ad-
vance the important public policy consideration of encouraging parties to
purchase insurance. See Doherty, supra note 1, at 265-66. That commentator also
notes that although some long-term environmental damages will occur whether
parties are insured or not, insurance helps reduce their cost to society in three
ways. See id. First, it spreads the risk to those who are "more efficient risk bearers."
Id. Second, "[b ]y tailoring premiums to the level of risk incurred, insurance forces
insured companies to ... assess and manage the risks involved in their activities."
Id. at 266. Third, insurance "reduces the costs of progressive injuries by decreasing
the risk of bankruptcy ... due to the threat of tremendous liability." Id. By afford-
ing the same degree of coverage to policyholders who allow gaps to form in their
insurance plans and policyholders who consistently maintain adequate insurance
programs, courts provide companies with a disincentive to obtain insurance. See
Owens-Illinois, 650 A.2d at 992 (explaining theory of transfer of risks as it relates to
insurance).
132. 633 F.2d 1212 (6th Cir. 1980). For a discussion of the facts of Forty-Eight
Insulations, see supra notes 80-84 and accompanying text.
133. See id. at 1224-25. The Forty-Eight Insulations court highlighted that failing
to apportion costs to the policyholder for uninsured periods conveys an unfair
benefit to the policyholder at the expense of its insurers. See id. The court also
explained that refusing to allocate these costs to the policyholder would mean that
'a manufacturer which had insurance coverage for only one year out of 20 would
be entitled to a complete defense.., the same as a manufacturer which had cover-
age for 20 years out of 20. Neither logic nor precedent support [sic] such a re-
sult." Id. at 1225.
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fense costs for uninsured periods to the policyholder, some courts
have held that the policyholder is not responsible for paying a por-
tion of the costs of the defense.1 3 4  That court reasoned that
"although such defense costs may be allocated among insurers,
such 'duty to apportion' does not apply to deny a policyholder its
contractual right to a complete defense where the policyholder was
not insured at all times."13 5
VII. CONCLUSION
Although it seems that the media and commentators have
been forever chronicling the continuing legal battles of long-tail,
multiple-trigger environmental claims, courts have had a relatively
brief period in which to determine liability in the coverage context.
Clearly, when drafted, the standard form CGL policy was not in-
tended to cover these environmental liabilities. As courts continue
to establish their positions regarding allocation issues, parties have
at least some basis for predicting how a jurisdiction will apportion
liability.
134. See, e.g., Gulf Chem. & Metallurgical Corp. v. Associated Metals & Miner-
als Corp., 1 F.3d 365 (5th Cir. 1993) (holding that "the insured must bear its share
of those [defense] costs determined by the fraction of the time of injurious expo-
sure in which it lacked coverage"); Budd Co. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 820 F.2d 787,
791 (6th Cir. 1987) (ruling that policyholder was obligated to reimburse its insurer
for defense costs of claims found to have occurred outside of insurer's policy pe-
riod). But see, e.g., Scottsdale Ins. Co. v. Homestead Land Dev. Corp., 1992 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 19525, at *21 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 3, 1992) (stating that "it would be pa-
tently unreasonable to expect an insurer to protect its insured against liabilities for
which the insured did not bargain... [a] ny conclusion to the contrary would lead
to a windfall to the insured").
135. County of San Bernadino v. Pacific Indem. Co., 56 Cal. App. 4th 666,
669 (1997). Significantly, because only the issue of the "duty to defend" was pres-
ent, neither the appellate nor the trial courts reached the issue of whether the
policyholder was responsible for paying the damages that occurred during the pe-
riod of self-insurance. See id. at 671-72, 675-77.
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